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The Judith Miller Case and the
Relationship between Reporter and
Source: Competing Visions of the
Media’s Role and Function
Daniel Joyce∗
“Confidential sources are the life’s blood of journalism.
Without them, whether they are in government, large or small
companies, or in non-profit organizations, people like me would be
out of business. As I painfully learned while covering intelligence
estimates of Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction, we
are only as good as our sources. If they are wrong, we will be
wrong. And a source’s confidence that we will not divulge their
identity is crucial to his or her readiness to come to us with
allegations of fraud or abuse or other wrongdoing, or even a
dissenting view about government policy or business practices that
the American public may need to know.”1
–Judith Miller, during testimony before the Senate Judiciary
Committee.
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1
Judith Miller, Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Committee of the U.S. Senate,
Oct. 19, 2005, available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1637&wit_
id=4698 (last visited on Jan. 16, 2007) [hereinafter Miller Testimony].

555

JOYCE_STAFFPROOF_032507

556

4/2/2007 11:58:15 AM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

Vol. XVII

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................556
I. THE FACTS OF THE MILLER CASE: AN EMERGING STORY ......559
II. JOURNALISTS AND THEIR SOURCES: THE NATURE OF
THE RELATIONSHIP AND WHAT IS BEING PROTECTED ............564
III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT’S APPROACH:
JUDITH MILLER AND BEYOND.................................................568
IV. THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE:
THE GOODWIN CASE...............................................................580
V. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW DIMENSION:
THE RANDAL CASE .................................................................584
VI. CONCLUSION...........................................................................587

INTRODUCTION
In 2005, the prize-winning yet controversial New York Times
reporter Judith Miller spent eighty-five days in prison.2 She
claimed to do this for a principle: that a reporter should not reveal
the identity of an anonymous source. It is argued that doing so
would endanger the media and their sources, and also jeopardize
their ability to gather news and critical information for the public
and to expose wrong-doing and corruption.3 On March 6, 2007,
I. Lewis Libby, the former chief of staff to Vice President Dick
Cheney, was convicted of obstruction of justice, making false

2

William E. Lee, The Priestly Class: Reflections on a Journalist’s Privilege,
23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 635, 639 (2006).
3
See id. at 638 (quoting Miller as saying before the Court that “‘[i]f journalists cannot
be trusted to guarantee confidentiality, then journalists cannot function and there cannot
be a free press.’”).
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statements to the F.B.I. and two counts of perjury.4 These charges
arose out of Miller and the federal grand jury investigation into the
leaking of the identity of a CIA operative Valerie Wilson (also
known as Plame) to the press.5
The controversy and mystery the case generated have focused
attention on the wider social role of the media.6 This in turn
highlights the law’s complex relationship in both defending and
articulating the role of the media in democracy and also in
potentially subverting this role in the interests of the administration
of justice.7 This case and the issue of the protection of journalistic
sources are significant then in the ongoing development of
competing visions of the media in American life.8 This essay
looks at the Judith Miller case, but does so to highlight the issues
underlying the role of the media and its relationship with the
courts. Post-Watergate, different visions of the media have
crystallized—one, a heroic vision of the journalist as muckraker
and watchdog, the other, of the media as an increasingly powerful
force in American life–complicit in corruption and governmental
power, rather than a useful check on such power.9 The Judith
Miller example is significant for the way in which it highlights the
tensions that exist between our desire for a heroic media and our
increasing fear of media power.10 Who is to watch the watchdog?

4

Neil A. Lewis, Libby, Ex-Cheney Aide, Guilty of Lying in C.I.A. Leak Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 7, 2007, at A1.
5
United States v. Libby, 432 F. Supp. 2d 26, 29 (D.D.C. 2006).
6
See Laura Durity, Shielding Journalist-“Bloggers”: The Need to Protect
Newsgathering Despite the Distribution Medium, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0011
(2006), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2006dltr0011.html
(discussing the response to Miller by Congress in pushing legislation forward to protect
the reporter’s privilege); see also infra text accompanying notes 204, 205.
7
See id.; see also text accompanying notes 204, 205.
8
See id.; see also text accompanying notes 204, 205.
9
Recent Case: Evidence—Journalist Privilege—District of Columbia Circuit Holds
That Privacy Act Suit Satisfies Two-Prong Test to Overcome Journalist Privilege to
Conceal Confidential Source—Lee v. Department of Justice, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir.
2005), 119 HARV. L. REV. 1923, 1930 (2006); see infra text accompanying notes 52, 53.
10
See Lee, supra note 2 (discussing the impact of the Miller controversy on the
reporter’s privilege and the public’s view of the media); see infra text accompanying
notes 52, 53.
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And just who are the watchdogs in an age of media deprofessionalization, citizen media and blogging?11
This essay considers the issues arising from the Judith Miller
controversy in the context of federal United States law concerning
the protection of journalistic sources, what is termed the reporter’s
privilege.12 It does so against a comparative backdrop of
developments in the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”)
in Strasbourg and in the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) in The Hague. This is done to
highlight the different ways in which the protection of journalistic
sources has been approached at the domestic and international
levels.
In the Miller example, much has hung on the fact that the
relationship between reporter and source has been one not only of
confidence and trust, but also of secrecy.13 In the Goodwin case at
the ECtHR, which this article considers, the identity of the source
was also initially undisclosed.14 There, however, the context was
one of a commercial whistle blower, involving arguments not only
for the protection of the source, but also for the legal protection of
confidential commercial information. The Randal case before the
ICTY,15 with which this article concludes, concerns the disclosure
of a source by the Washington Post.16 This case does not concern
the issue of whether a journalist can be forced to reveal the identity
of a source, but rather presents the issue of whether a journalist,
after the event, should be forced to testify in the prosecution of his
source for crimes under international criminal law.17 Here the
11
Stephanie J. Frazee, Note, Bloggers as Reporters: An Effect-Based Approach to First
Amendment Protections in a New Age of Information Dissemination, 3 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 609, 623 (2006) (discussing who is protected by the reporter’s privilege); see
Durity, supra note 6 (discussing who qualifies as a journalist).
12
See Durity, supra note 6.
13
See Miller Testimony, supra note 1.
14
Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 484, available at
http://worldii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1996/16.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2007); see also infra
text accompanying notes 157–184.
15
Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, Case No. IT-99-36-AR3.9,
Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, (Dec. 11, 2002).
16
See id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 188–203.
17
See id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 188–203 (discussing underlying
issues of the Randal case).
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sensitivity derived from the relationship between reporter and
source necessary for effective news-gathering, not merely the
confidentiality of the source’s identity.18 By focusing on the Judith
Miller case, this essay examines, against a comparative
background, our conflicting desires for the media at an historical
moment when the fear of media power and lack of accountability
challenge our heroic vision of the press.
I. THE FACTS OF THE MILLER CASE: AN EMERGING STORY
The facts of the Miller case are confusing and to some degree
contested. Many details have only recently emerged, and continue
to do so as this article goes to press against the background of the
ongoing Libby trial.19 In early 2002, former ambassador Joseph
Wilson traveled to Niger for the CIA to investigate the claim that
Iraq had purchased uranium from the African country.20 This trip
occurred in the context of fears of the development of weapons of
mass destruction (“WMD”) by Iraq, and the threat this posed.21 In
March 2003, a US led coalition invaded Iraq.22 Arguments
concerning WMD formed a backdrop to the invasion and this led
to media interest in the validity of such claims.23 On July 6, 2003,
Wilson wrote an op-ed for the New York Times in which he
contradicted government claims about Iraq’s purchase of uranium
from an African country.24 This led to government clarification
that the Niger story had been misleading.25
On July 14, 2003, commentator Robert Novak revealed in his
column that Wilson’s wife, Valerie Plame, was a CIA operative,

18

See id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 188–203.
See NPR.org, Timeline: The CIA Leak Case, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=4764919 (last visited Jan. 11, 2007); NYTimes.com, Timeline of a
Leak, http://www.nytimes.com/ref/washington/2006_LEAKTIMELINE_GRAPHIC.html
(last visited Jan. 11, 2007).
20
See Timeline: The CIA Leak Case, supra note 19; see also Timeline of a Leak, supra
note 19 (discussing Wilson’s travel to Niger).
21
See Timeline: The CIA Leak Case, supra note 19.
22
See id.
23
See, e.g., id. (discussing media interests).
24
See id.
25
See id. (discussing further clarifications by the government).
19
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information only recently revealed to have been originally sourced
from former deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage (Novak’s
other sources were also recently revealed as being Karl Rove and
Bill Harlow), who is also said to have revealed her identity to Bob
Woodward.26 Shortly after, on July 17, an online Time article by
Matthew Cooper, Massimo Calabresi and John Dickerson also
indicated that government officials had revealed to them the
identity of Plame in the context of the Wilson/Niger controversy.27
This led to speculation about the White House leaking the
information to damage Wilson, and that senior presidential advisor
Karl Rove may have been involved in the leaking of this
information.28
On September 28, the CIA called for an
investigation into the leak and two days later the Justice
Department launched a criminal investigation.29 Revealing the
identity of a CIA operative in certain contexts can form the basis
for a federal offense.30
On December 30, 2003, the Justice Department appointed
Patrick Fitzgerald as special counsel and a grand jury investigation
continued involving administration officials and the press.31 The
investigation went as high as the President who was questioned in
private by a team of federal prosecutors.32 On August 9, 2004,
U.S. District Court Judge Thomas Hogan held Cooper in contempt
of court for refusing to reveal his confidential source’s identity to
the grand jury and ordered him to jail.33 Cooper subsequently
avoided jail and agreed to questioning by prosecutors.34 On
26

Neil A. Lewis, First Source of C.I.A. Leak Admits Role, Lawyer Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 30, 2006; Eric Lichtblau, Journalists said to Figure in Strategy in Leak Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2005; Jim VandeHei and Carol D. Leonnig, Woodward Was Told of
Plame More Than Two Years Ago, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2005.
27
Matthew Cooper, Massimo Calebresi & John F. Dickerson, A War On Wilson?,
TIME, July 17, 2003, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,465270,00.html?
internalid=ACA.
28
Timeline: The CIA Leak Case, supra note 19.
29
Id.
30
See id.; see also, Richard W. Stevenson & Eric Lichtblau, The Struggle for Iraq:
Intelligence; President Orders Full Cooperation in Leaking of Name, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
2003, at A6.
31
Timeline of a Leak, supra note 19.
32
Id.
33
Id. The order was stayed pending an appeal. Id.
34
Timeline: The CIA Leak Case, supra note 19.
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August 12, Judith Miller was subpoenaed to appear before the
grand jury and on October 7 she was held in contempt for refusing
to name her confidential sources, with the order sending her to jail
again stayed pending her appeal.35 Several days later, on
October 13, Cooper was again held in contempt for refusing to
name his confidential source.36 On June 27, 2005, the U.S.
Supreme Court declined to review the appeals of Cooper and
Miller,37 and several days later Time agreed to hand over their
reporter Cooper’s notes and emails to prosecutors.38 On July 6,
2005, Miller was jailed and Cooper agreed to cooperate claiming
that his confidential source (later revealed as Karl Rove) had
waived their agreement and that consequently he had been released
from his obligation to protect the source’s identity.39
The investigation continued, as did speculation concerning the
role and motives of Rove, Cheney and others.40 Cooper eventually
revealed that he had spoken to Rove and learned certain details
about Plame’s work for the CIA. Speculation and confusion also
continued about Novak’s role and the identity of his sources until
the recent revelation that Armitage was the original leaker.41
Judith Miller was released from jail on September 29, 2005, having
secured an uncoerced waiver from her source.42 The next day she
gave evidence to the grand jury and the New York Times identified
her source as being Lewis Libby, Chief of Staff to the Vice
President.43 Rove gave further evidence and Miller initially
claimed Libby did not name Plame although he did discuss her

35

Id.
Id.
37
Miller v. United States, cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005); Cooper v. United
States, cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005).
38
Timeline: The CIA Leak Case, supra note 19.
39
Id.
40
See generally Timeline: The CIA Leak Case, supra note 19; see also Timeline of a
Leak, supra note 19.
41
See also Robert Novak, My Role in the Plame Leak Probe, CHI. SUN TIMES, July 12,
2006, at 14; David Johnston, Novak Told Prosecutor His Sources in Leak Case, N.Y.
TIMES, July 12, 2006, A16; Rupert Cornwell, Bush Officials Cleared as Powell’s Former
Deputy Admits Unmasking CIA Agent, INDEP. (London), Sept. 9, 2006, at 36.
42
Timeline: The CIA Leak Case, supra note 19.
43
Timeline of a Leak, supra note 19.
36
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CIA work.44 Consequently, there is confusion over the naming of
Plame/Wilson in Miller’s notebook, and in her testimony in
Libby’s trial she appears to be saying now that Libby did name
Plame/Wilson in their conversations.45 Cooper also has testified
that Rove first talked to him about Wilson and that this was
confirmed by Libby in a subsequent conversation.
On October 28, 2005, Libby was indicted on charges relating to
obstruction of justice, perjury and the making of a false
statement.46 He has resigned and was convicted in 2007 on four of
five charges.47 At present, the investigation looks to have run its
course, but questions have been raised about its conduct following
the revelation that Armitage (along subsequently with Rove and
Harlow) was the original source for Novak, and that Fitzgerald
knew of this from the beginning.48 Some have argued that this
damages theories about Rove and a high level government initiated
smear campaign against the Wilsons.49 With Rove being advised
on June 13, 2006 that he will not be charged, some of the mystery
over the investigation is beginning to abate.50 Controversy of
course remains, especially with a suit filed by the Wilsons against
Cheney, Libby and Rove.51 As this article goes to press, Libby’s
trial has finished, triggering renewed media attention, promising
new revelations and increased attention to the issues with which
this article is concerned. Libby’s defense appears to be that he has
been scapegoated by the administration in an effort to protect Karl
Rove and others.
The Miller example, in particular, is an unfortunate test case
for the journalistic privilege because the context of the relationship
between Miller and her source does not fit neatly into the heroic

44

Id.
Id; see also Neil A Lewis & Scott Shane, Reporter Who Was Jailed Testifies in Libby
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2007.
46
Timeline of a Leak, supra note 19.
47
Libby, Guilty of Lying, supra note 4.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
45
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paradigm typically asserted in defense of the privilege.52 Yet,
while an exceptional case, it will arguably continue to shape the
wider debate over the protection of sources and the now
contentious role for the media in democratic politics. Miller
herself has come under attack from a wide range of parties and
interest groups.53 Since her release from jail, Miller has been the
subject of criticism from her own newspaper, leading to her
resignation from the New York Times.
It has been hard to determine whether Miller has indeed been a
watchdog or a lap dog in this process, and the case has also
sparked wider political controversy flowing from her role in
articulating the government’s case for the war in Iraq in a number
of prominent articles in the New York Times.54 To this degree, part
of the debate also concerns the responsibilities and role of the
Times as “the paper of record” in the United States.55 In this
context, and in the present controversy, some have questioned her
close relationship with government officials, and criticized the
style of “access” journalism which she (and others such as
Woodward in recent times) has practiced. From this perspective it
can be seen that the treatment of Miller has reflected a trend
towards public skepticism regarding the mass media and its power
in American political life.56 There has been comparatively little
public protest at her jailing, though of course there has been
intense media interest and speculation.57 Another dimension has
been the issue of corporate ownership of the media and the

52

See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Journalist Privilege and Law Enforcement Leaks,
available at http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2005/11/journalist_priv_1.html
(last visited Jan. 11, 2007) (arguing that the journalist privilege should apply when the
leak is in the public interest, which does not apply to the Valerie Plame leak).
53
See, e.g., Dan Froomkin, Miller’s Big Secret, WASH. POST, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/blog/2005/09/30/BL2005093000669.html
(last
visited Mar. 16, 2007).
54
See generally Michael Massing, Now They Tell Us?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, vol. 51,
no. 3, Feb. 26, 2004.
55
See generally HOWARD FRIEL & RICHARD FALK, THE RECORD OF THE PAPER: HOW
THE NEW YORK TIMES MISREPORTS U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (Verso 2004).
56
See ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY: COMMUNICATION
POLITICS IN DUBIOUS TIMES (New Press 2000).
57
See Nicholas Lemann, The Wayward Press: Telling Secrets: How a Leak Became a
Scandal, NEW YORKER, Nov. 7, 2005, at 48.
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perception that this may lessen media companies’ advocacy for
their journalists.58 It is important then to see the broader historical
and political context within which the arguments for the protection
of sources occur. The position of the journalist as an actor in
American life is also part of the story, along with the wider
institutional role of the media.
II. JOURNALISTS AND THEIR SOURCES: THE NATURE OF THE
RELATIONSHIP AND WHAT IS BEING PROTECTED
When considering the legal status of the reporter’s privilege in
U.S. law, it must first be noted that the Miller case and the position
in U.S. federal law as discussed in this essay is the exception rather
than the rule. First, this is due to the fact that the Miller case
concerns the question of whether the privilege is available in a
grand jury criminal law context (the end of the spectrum for the
privilege most likely to conflict with the concern for due process
and the efficient and effective operation of criminal law
proceedings before the courts).59 Second, the setting for Miller and
Cooper’s requested testimony is in a federal law context where
exceptionally there is no federal shield legislation to consider as of
yet.60 This is in contrast to the great majority of states of the
Union and the District of Columbia where such legislation exists in
varying forms.61 However, free speech advocates such as Judith
Miller’s lawyer Floyd Abrams warn of complacency, and
characterize the situation regarding the reporter’s privilege as bleak

58

See Editorial, Who Has Your Back? Journalism in the Corporate Age, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV., Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 7.
59
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 965 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
60
The U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee has held a number of hearings regarding this
issue and the reporter’s privilege. See, e.g., Reporters’ Privilege Legislation: Issues and
Implications: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005), available
at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1579 (last visited Nov. 14, 2006); see also
Free Flow of Information Bill, H.R. 3323, 109th Cong. (2005), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:H.R.3323.IH: (last visited Nov. 14, 2006);
Free Flow of Information Bill, S. 1419, 109th Cong. (2005), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:S.1419: (last visited Sept. 27, 2006).
61
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 993 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(Tatel, J., concurring).
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especially in contrast to the more protective European
jurisprudence as typified by the Goodwin case.62 Abrams writes:
While forty-nine of the fifty states have provided total or
partial protection for confidential sources, and many federal
courts have done so as well, a number of courts in recent
years have provided little or no protection at all. Worse
yet, a spate of “leak investigations,” in which journalists
have been targeted to reveal the identities [of confidential
sources] . . . have posed increasing threats to the ability of
the press to do its job.63
Generally, what is sought to be protected by the media is the
identity of confidential sources relied upon by journalists in their
news-gathering and reporting, especially where without such an
offer of confidentiality, the source, typically a whistleblower or
insider, would be unable or unwilling to give valuable information
to the reporter.64 What is at issue then is the ability of journalists
to perform their work in the central, but difficult, genres of
political reportage, news, and investigative reporting.65 What is at
stake is the freedom of the press as configured in a constitutional
context, but also the right of the public to receive information as it
relates to core political speech and political communication.66
In a society where deliberation lies at the heart of democratic
theory and where speech is strongly protected by the Constitution,
the idea of the reporter’s privilege is a significant one. The
protection sought varies according to context. The privilege is
more likely to be recognized in civil rather than criminal contexts,
and also where the source to be protected is confidential rather
than non-confidential, although as we shall see this is not always
the case in an international criminal law context.67 A journalist’s
62

See FLOYD ABRAMS, SPEAKING FREELY: TRIALS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (Viking
2005).
63
Id.
64
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693 (1972).
65
See generally Jeffrey S. Nestler, Comment, The Underprivileged Profession: The
Case for Supreme Court Recognition of the Journalist’s Privilege, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 201
(2005).
66
Id.
67
See discussion infra The International Criminal Law Dimension: The Randal Case.
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argument for resisting giving evidence will be strongest where they
are seen to be a non-party to proceedings and where there are other
means for the courts to gather such information.68 Generally,
journalists are seen as citizens and no different from others, when
they directly eyewitness events and are thus expected to give
evidence in such a context.69 In fact, in the Miller case the
prosecutor argued this eyewitness exception in relation to the
journalists, as the crime alleged might be committed directly
through disclosure by the source to the journalist. In a sense then,
Special Prosecutor Fitzgerald earlier argued from a rationale that
the journalists involved should testify due to their proximity not
only to the evidence sought, but more so to the commission of the
offense being investigated.70
It must be remembered too that Miller (unlike Matthew Cooper
or Robert Novak) did not publish an article and thereby disclose
sensitive information to the wider public.71 So, what is sought to
be protected from the journalist’s perspective can be (often beyond
even a particular story or scoop) the relationship established
between reporter and source, and the trust and ongoing confidence
flowing from this, both in terms of the specific relationship, say
between Libby and Miller, and also the wider reputation of the
media in the eyes of potential sources.72 Miller was, on her
account, prepared to go to jail for the principle at stake even where
no story was directly at issue.73 What was at issue was her
credibility, the credibility of her paper, the New York Times, and
the broader legal protection for and societal status of the media at
large.
68

See N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 185 (2d Cir. 2006).
See id.
70
United States v. Libby, 432 F. Supp. 2d 26, 44 (D.D.C. 2006). Litigation is ongoing
in the Libby prosecution concerning his subpoenas concerning various news
organizations and journalists. In the opinion of Judge Walton of the District Court for the
District of Columbia, “this Court concludes that the First Amendment does not protect a
news reporter, or that reporter’s news organization, from producing documents pursuant
to a Rule 17(c) subpoena in a criminal prosecution when the news reporter is personally
involved in the activity that forms the predicate for the criminal offences charged in the
indictment.” Id.
71
Timeline: The CIA Leak Case, supra note 19.
72
See Miller Testimony, supra note 1.
73
Id.
69
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Given the complexity of rationales and the competition
between legal and media principles and ethics which arises, I argue
that a useful means to approach the privilege and the cases is by
focusing on the relationship between journalist and source. This
will require the courts to cede some ground in a sense to the
concerns of the media in any given case, but this is perhaps
appropriate given the courts final authority in any matter and to
avoid the situation as illustrated by Judith Miller, where the courts’
rationales and the media’s internal culture seem irreconcilable.74
Without legislative intervention, the troubling result is the jailing
of increasing numbers of reporters without any great evidentiary or
procedural outcome in terms of the administration of justice.75 If
we accept that the media should approach more carefully their
relationship with confidential sources, especially when such
relationships fall outside traditional heroic understandings of the
media as a watchdog or fourth estate, then so too must the courts,
and perhaps more importantly zealous prosecutors, come to
understand why journalists are prepared to suffer incarceration to
protect their relationships with sources.
The Miller affair then can also be seen as a clash of cultures:
media and legal.76 From this flow assumptions within each culture
of the position and power of each institution in a democratic
society and also of the capacities of each in terms of truth-seeking,
fact-finding, and the monitoring of centers of political power77 in
any constitutional arrangement. Beyond the dichotomy involved
in such ‘clash of cultures’ analysis it is also necessary to see that
there remains some confusion even within each culture as to how
the relationship and the privilege is to be characterized.
Some see the privilege as belonging to the source and deriving
from the relationship of confidence, such that it might be waived at
a later point. Even here, as illustrated by the Miller case, there are
differing opinions as to what might constitute such a waiver, for
74
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 986 (Tatel, J.,
concurring).
75
Nestler, supra note 65, at 243–46.
76
Id. at 247–48.
77
For a discussion of this as the function of journalism, see ROBERT FISK, THE GREAT
WAR FOR CIVILIZATION: THE CONQUEST OF THE MIDDLE EAST (Knopf 2005).
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Miller has argued that she waited for a full and uncoerced waiver
from Libby before agreeing to testify.78 Media lawyers have
tended to say that the privilege belongs to the media and thus it is
for the reporter to waive. This underscores the personal nature of
the relationship under scrutiny and helps to explain the differences
of opinion that result even within the media itself. As Miller
testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee, there needs to be a
resolution of the issue of waiver, with the present system designed
for stalemate:
Yes, the legal machinations in my case were enormously
complex, but the principle I was defending was fairly
straightforward: once reporters give a pledge to keep a
source’s identity confidential, they must be willing to honor
that pledge and not testify unless the source gives explicit,
personal permission for them to do so, and they are able—
toi [sic] protect other confidential sources.
Eventually, when the fuss over my case dies down, I hope
journalists and politicians will begin examining the real
issues at stake here, especially the question of when and
under what circumstances a waiver can be considered
voluntary. Struggling with such a weighty question alone in
jail was hardly ideal. I did the best I could under rather
challenging circumstances.79

III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT’S APPROACH:
JUDITH MILLER AND BEYOND
From the outset it should be noted that the privilege derives
from a number of sources, depending on the specific setting for its
claim: the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, state
constitutional provisions, the various state shield statutes and also
arguably from the common law which recognizes a set of
traditional privileges.80 For the purposes of this essay, I shall focus
on the law as it applies to the exceptional case of Judith Miller at
78
79
80

Timeline: The CIA Leak Case, supra note 19.
Miller Testimony, supra note 1.
See Lee, supra note 2, at 683–84.
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the federal level, focusing in particular on the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence.
The Branzburg case81 is the leading, if somewhat ambiguous,
authority in the US on the reporter’s privilege in the case of a
grand jury. The 1972 Supreme Court case, and in particular the
judgment of Justice Powell, has been variously interpreted by
federal courts as both opening up the possibility for a common law
privilege, and as excluding it in the grand jury context.82
The case of Branzburg arose from three appeals involving
reporter testimony before grand juries in a criminal law context,
one federal, another from Massachusetts where no shield laws
applied, and the other from Kentucky where the relevant shield law
was inapplicable.83 The reporter, Branzburg, was involved in two
cases from Kentucky where he had observed and written about
marijuana use. The Massachusetts case involved newsgathering in
relation to the Black Panthers, and the federal case involved a New
York Times reporter also covering the Black Panthers and other
militant groups.84 All refused to testify before grand juries.
Justice White delivered the majority opinion, in which the court,
with the ambiguous support of Justice Powell, refused to recognize
an absolute or qualified privilege for reporters from testifying
before grand juries in relation to their confidential sources, where
no shield law applies.85
As Justice White noted “[t]he heart of the claim is that the
burden on news gathering resulting from compelling reporters to
disclose confidential information outweighs any public interest in
obtaining the information.”86 While recognizing the importance of
confidential sources in journalistic practice, Justice White argued
with the majority that reporters could not be distinguished from
other citizens when it came to their duty to give evidence when
subpoenaed before grand juries in relation to criminal
81

Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
See Nestler, supra note 65, at 220–25.
83
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 665.
84
Id. at 667–79.
85
For Justice White’s majority opinion, see id. at 667–709. For Justice Powell’s
concurrence, see id. at 709–10.
86
408 U.S. at 681.
82
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investigations.87 Justice White noted that the right of a reporter to
gather information is not unrestrained.88 He wrote:
A number of States have provided newsmen a statutory
privilege of varying breadth, but the majority have not done
so, and none has been provided by federal statute. Until
now the only testimonial privilege for unofficial witnesses
that is rooted in the Federal Constitution is the Fifth
Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
We are asked to create another by interpreting the First
Amendment to grant newsmen a testimonial privilege that
other citizens do not enjoy. This we decline to do.89
The majority considered appearance in such a context to be a
citizen’s duty. Ultimately, the majority held there to be no danger
for reporter or source except where either were implicated in
criminal activity themselves, and hence undeserving of protection.
Justice White insisted too that this involved no prior restraint, and
that the Court could not condone the “theory that it is better to
write about crime than to do something about it.”90 Justice White
considered the argument about the negative consequences that
might result for the flow of news and information, but without
clear evidence for this he regarded much of this line of reasoning
as “speculative.”91 The majority noted that “the privilege claimed
is that of the reporter,”92 but concluded that “[f]rom the beginning
of our country the press has operated without constitutional
protection for press informants, and the press has flourished.”93
The majority also seemed to indicate that while a qualified
privilege was being sought in this case, at essence, the question of
resolving competing legal and media values was all or nothing.
“For them, it would appear that only an absolute privilege would

87
88
89
90
91
92
93

Id. at 682–91.
Id. at 689–90.
Id.
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 692.
Id. at 693–94.
Id. at 695.
Id. at 698–99.
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suffice.”94 It is this failure to reconcile and compromise that has
seen the tension over this issue grow with time.
As in other cases, and with the issue of a federal shield law, the
practical issue of how to define a journalist, and whether this
would let “the lonely pamphleteer”95 or the blogger of the present
day, claim such a privilege, weighed against its recognition.96 The
argument being that without a system of licensing, odious to the
media and likely ineffective, anyone could claim to be a
journalist.97 This is an issue with particular poignancy in the
present era with the de-professionalization of journalism, the rise
of the celebrity blogger and the turn to citizen media.98 Justice
White also appeared to be arguing that the press were powerful
enough without such protection, and further that where testimony
was sought, it would be done under the careful supervision of the
courts.99
Justice Powell’s concurring opinion has been considered
ambiguous as he felt the need to “emphasize . . . the limited nature
of the Court’s holding.”100 In essence he argued that there was
constitutional protection for reporters who could argue the merits
on a case by case basis such that a balance between “freedom of
the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant
testimony with respect to criminal conduct” is achieved.101 It
would be possible for journalists to resist such subpoenas and for
accommodation by means such as protective orders to be achieved.
Justice Stewart’s powerful dissent was also referred to by Justice

94

Id. at 702.
Id. at 704.
96
See also Linda L. Berger, Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of Journalism
to Protect the Journalist’s Privilege in an Infinite Universe of Publication, 39 HOUS. L.
REV. 1371 (2003).
97
See Geoffrey R. Stone, Testimony on a Proposed Journalist-Source Privilege to the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, University of Chicago Law School Occasional Paper
Number 46, at 11, available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/occasional-papers/
stone-46.pdf (2005).
98
See, e.g., DAN GILLMOR, WE THE MEDIA: GRASSROOTS JOURNALISM BY THE PEOPLE,
FOR THE PEOPLE (O’Reilly Media 2004).
99
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 706–07.
100
Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
101
Id. at 710.
95
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Powell,102 especially where Stewart had written of the danger of
the state’s annexation of “the journalistic profession as an
investigative arm of government.”103 And Stewart himself wrote
that “Justice Powell’s enigmatic concurring opinion gives some
hope of a more flexible view in the future . . .”104
Justice Stewart (joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall)
wrote powerfully of the dangers confronting the freedom of the
press and their ability to function, but also to the administration of
justice, if the flow of information was impeded, and in doing so he
recognized the significance of the news-gathering process.105 He
wrote: “[t]he right to gather news implies, in turn, a right to a
confidential relationship between a reporter and his source.”106 In
doing so he focused on the relationship between reporter and
source as being critical, something later picked up by both
European and international criminal jurisprudence as subsequently
noted.107 The focus was not on the motives of the source, but on
the relationship in the context of the flow of information and the
media’s constitutional role in this dimension.108 Justice Stewart
also argued, as have others, that the majority’s position would lead
to self-censorship and send the wrong signal to future
whistleblowers.109 The conflicting need for evidence before grand
juries was not absolute as illustrated by other common law
evidentiary privileges and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.110
Rather what would be lost would be the free and open debate
necessary to democracy and decision-making and recognized in
cases such as the 1964 landmark U.S. Supreme Court First
Amendment decision of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.111
Justice Stewart indicated that a qualified privilege would be better
suited than the majority’s apparent refusal, and proposed a three102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

Id. at 709.
Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 726–28.
Id. at 728.
Id. at 729–30.
Id. at 726 n.1, 730.
Id. at 731.
Id. at 737.
Id. at 738; N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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point alternative formulation which has been adopted in
subsequent cases in lower courts which have recognized the
privilege. The government must:
(1) show that there is probable cause to believe that the
newsman has information that is clearly relevant to a
specific probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate that the
information sought cannot be obtained by alternate means
less destructive of First Amendment rights; and
(3) demonstrate a compelling and overriding interest in the
information.112
As discussed earlier, the legacy of Branzburg has been
controversial with a divergence at the federal appellate court level
in terms of how the decision has been interpreted in the context of
the reporter’s privilege.113 The Supreme Court denied Miller and
Cooper’s petition for writ of certiorari,114 and consequently in
terms of the Miller case, the final appellate interpretation remains
at the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. It
seems clear that despite the need for the Supreme Court to revisit
this case or for federal legislation to remedy its troubling
outcomes, that the majority position in Branzburg refusing to
recognize a reporter’s privilege in the context of criminal grand
jury investigations remains the law.115
This was certainly the position taken by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Miller.116 Because
of the similarity of Miller to the Branzburg facts, Judge Tatel
112

Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 743.
For recent decision flatly rejecting the privilege in criminal cases, see United States
v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1998). For decisions recognizing various degrees of
qualified privilege, in addition to those discussed in this article, see, for example, Price v.
Time, Inc., 416 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2005); In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37 (1st
Cir. 2004); Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 2000).
114
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005), reh’g
denied, 405 F.3d 17 (2005), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005).
115
See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669–670 (1991) (harmonizing
Branzburg with a “well-established line of decisions” holding that the press has no
special immunity from the application of general laws); Miller, 397 F.3d at 970 (“The
Highest Court has spoken and never revisited the question. Without doubt, that is the end
of the matter.”).
116
Miller, 397 F.3d 964.
113
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concurred in the majority decision, while indicating that there
might be some scope for future elaboration of the reporter’s
privilege from a common law foundation.117 Tatel further
recognized the tension underlying Miller and the unsatisfactory
nature of the law at present, recognizing from the beginning that,
“[t]his case involves a clash between two truth-seeking institutions:
the grand jury and the press.”118 Tatel was also prepared to find
Branzburg “more ambiguous than do my colleagues.”119 He
concurred with the majority but made it clear that the context for
consideration of the privilege had changed since Branzburg,
continuing: “I believe that the consensus of forty-nine states plus
the District of Columbia—and even the Department of Justice—
would require us to protect reporters’ sources as a matter of federal
common law were the leak at issue either less harmful or more
newsworthy.”120
Judge Tatel’s concurring opinion in fact appears to revive the
ambiguity with which Justice Powell’s involvement in the
Branzburg majority has been interpreted. Though Branzburg is
presently settled law, Miller seems to indicate that it may be time
for the Supreme Court to reconsider Branzburg with a future case
whose facts are more deserving of the heroic paradigm of the
journalist as a public watchdog, especially so outside of the context
of criminal investigations and national security concerns.121 There
is much in Judge Tatel’s opinion to spark future challenges as he
stated ominously, “I am uncertain that Branzburg offers ‘no
support’ for a constitutional reporter privilege in the grand jury
context.”122
However, in the subsequent case of Lee v. Dep’t of Justice,123
which concerned a Chinese-American scientist accused of
espionage involving the transfer of nuclear weapons information to
117

Id. at 986–87.
Id. at 986.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 986–87.
121
Id. at 994.
122
Id. at 987.
123
413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005), reh’g denied, 428 F.3d 299 (2005). But see Lee, 428
F.3d 299 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (arguing for a public importance requirement to be
attached to the Zerilli test).
118
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China while working at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the
courts have kept to their tough approach to the recent claims of
journalists regarding their anonymous sources.124 The Supreme
Court has yet again denied a petition for writ of certiorari, leaving
Branzburg intact.125 In Lee, the scientist had, having agreed to a
plea deal for the lesser charge of mishandling classified
information, initiated a privacy case against federal agencies, and
sought discovery orders against reporters to determine whether
information about him had been aggressively leaked to the press
during the investigation by senior government officials such as the
then Secretary of State for Energy, Bill Richardson.126
A district court had held five journalists in contempt for
refusing to disclose their anonymous sources to Lee.127 The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the contempt orders
for all appellants save for one, Jeff Gerth, where the court found
there was insufficient evidence.128 Judge Sentelle gave the opinion
for the Court and focused on a two-prong test for overcoming the
privilege in such a civil action (in contrast to Miller), set out in the
earlier case of Zerilli v. Smith.129 According to the court’s
interpretation of this test, two conditions must be satisfied to
determine::
[w]hen a plaintiff may compel a non-party journalist to
testify to the identity of his confidential sources. First, the
information sought must go to “the heart of the matter” and
not be merely marginally relevant. . . . Second, the plaintiff
must have exhausted “every reasonable alternative source
of information” so that journalists are not simply a default
source of information for plaintiffs.130

124

Lee, 413 F.3d at 64.
See Recent Case: Evidence—Journalist Privilege—District of Columbia Holds that
Privacy Act Satisfies Two-Prong Test To Overcome Journalist Privilege to Conceal
Confidential Sources, Lee v. Department of Justice, 413 F. 3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005), 119
HARV. L. REV. 1923, 1930 (2006).
126
See Lee, 413 F.3d at 62.
127
Id. at 55.
128
Id.
129
656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
130
Lee, 413 F.3d at 57.
125
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Given the exhaustive and unsuccessful discovery efforts Lee
employed with regard to the government agencies, the District
Court had found these elements to be satisfied. Judge Sentelle
emphasized that the Supreme Court in Branzburg had “flatly
rejected the existence of any such constitutional privilege”131 with
regard to the First Amendment, and here the court refused to enter
into the controversy over the nature of a federal common law
privilege.132 Having found that any such privilege would be
qualified in any event, the court emphasized that the context for the
source protection and the behavior of the media would be
significant elements in any determination. Again the court seemed
to be saying that the privilege would have to fit a heroic paradigm
of the media performing a watchdog role.133 This was contrasted
with “a civil action such as this one, where testimony of journalists
is sought because government officials have been accused of
illegally providing the journalists with private information.”134
Here, too Judge Sentelle emphasized that:
this case does not involve a claim of “forbidden intrusion
on the field of free expression.” There is no suggestion that
the court or any branch of government in any fashion
attempted to interfere with or now attempts to interfere
with the Appellant journalists’ right to print or
communicate anything they choose.135
In other words, these facts did not fit the classic First
Amendment territory of a case such as New York Times v.
Sullivan.136 Further, this reveals a narrow view of the rationale for
the protection, neglecting to emphasize the systemic importance of
source protection as an ongoing modus operandi for the media.137
The court concluded that the Zerilli test had been met and deferred
to the judgment of the lower courts.138
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

Id.
Id. at 57 n.2.
See id. at 59–60.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 58.
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 413 F.3d 53, 60–61 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Id.
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Another recent decision involving Judith Miller and the New
York Times continues in this hardening approach towards the
media and their anonymous sources in the courts.139 The case
involved attempts by the United States government to subpoena
the phone records of New York Times reporters, including Judith
Miller.140 Such records were sought during an investigation of an
alleged disclosure of information concerning raids and asset
freezing in relation to organizations suspected of raising finances
for and supporting terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11th
attacks.141 The reporters concerned refused to cooperate with a
grand jury investigation and the government sought the records
from the phone companies.142
The New York Times sought a declaratory judgment that the
records were protected by the reporter’s privilege derived from
both the common law and First Amendment. The District Court
judge at first instance granted this motion on the grounds of both a
common law and First Amendment qualified privilege and the
failure of the government to overcome such a privilege. Judge
Winter, for the majority in the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, overturned this decision on the basis of Branzburg as
concerns the First Amendment claim, and on the facts involving
threats to national security in relation to any common law
privilege. Having dismissed the First Amendment claim, Judge
Winter would not decide whether in fact a common law privilege
existed at all “because any such privilege would be overcome as a
matter of law on the present facts.”143 In a strongly worded
opinion, Judge Winter points to the fact that the evidence from the
media is critical to the grand jury investigation, regarding
“disclosures of upcoming asset freezes/searches and informing the

139

N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006); see also McKevitt v.
Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003), along with the commentary on the postBranzburg jurisprudence in Kyu Ho Youm, International and Comparative Law on the
Journalist’s Privilege: The Randal Case as a Lesson for the American Press, 1 J. INT’L
MEDIA & ENT. L. 1, 18–21 (2006).
140
N.Y. Times v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d at 162.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 163.
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targets of them”144 and that there is a “compelling governmental
interest in the investigation.”145 Again, the courts seem to be
saying that to qualify for First Amendment or common law
protection, the media’s activity has to fit the parameters of
traditional notions of a watchdog ideal. Context is the key to any
protection and the vision of the role the media should be playing,
as against the one it played here, is clear in the following passage:
We see no danger to a free press in so holding. Learning of
imminent law enforcement asset freezes/searches and
informing targets of them is not an activity essential, or
even common, to journalism. Where such reporting
involves the uncovering of government corruption or
misconduct in the use of investigative powers, courts can
easily find appropriate means of protecting the journalists
involved and their sources.146
The message from the court is that the privilege is to protect
the media from “[o]fficial harassment” but not to protect the press
when it is linked to potential criminal activity,147 especially where
there are national security implications. In an important corrective
opinion, the dissenting Judge Sack reflects on the implications of
disclosure of telephone records for the profession of journalism,
and disagrees with the majority’s narrow reading of Branzburg.148
Further, the dissenting opinion joins in the approach of Judge Tatel
in In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller.149 For Judge Sack
there is “no doubt that there has been developed . . . federal
common-law protection for journalists’ sources . . . .”150 Judge
Sack writes of the privilege, “[i]t is palpable; it is ubiquitous; it is
widely relied upon; it is an integral part of the way in which the
American public is kept informed and therefore of the American
democratic process.”151
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151

Id. at 171.
Id. at 171.
Id. at 171–72.
Id. at 172; see also, In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2004).
N.Y. Times v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d at 178 (Sack, J., dissenting).
See 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. 2005).
N.Y. Times v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d at 181.
Id.
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In doing so, the dissent also makes reference to international
practice in the protection of confidential sources and the case of
Goodwin.152 The dissent also argues that leaks, though damaging
in certain contexts, play an important role in combating corruption
and in improving the functioning of government.153 In matters of
secrecy, the government, the public and the press necessarily
operate in “healthy adversarial tension,”154 befitting a conflict
model of press and government relations.155 This is an important
opinion, but in the recent cases discussed the tide appears to have
turned against such a protective view of the legal rights of the
media.156
Despite the strength of protection for speech offered by the
United States Constitution’s First Amendment and the highly
developed protections for the media in other contexts, the confused
approach presently taken at a Supreme Court level, and the
toughening stance towards the protection of journalistic sources
being taken in recent United States appellate decisions, contrasts
with the European human rights jurisprudence which has emerged
following consideration of the role and function of the media in
democracy in the context of Article 10.157 I now turn to discuss
both the European framework and the leading case of Goodwin to
amplify this contrast.

152

Id. at 181 n.9.
Id. at 183.
154
Id. at 184.
155
Id.
156
See, e.g., Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
157
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (Rome, 4 Nov. 1950), 312 E.T.S. 5, as amended by Protocol No. 3, E.T.S. 45;
Protocol No. 5, E.T.S. 55; Protocol No. 8, E.T.S. 118; and Protocol No. 11, E.T.S. 155;
entered into force 3 Sept. 1953 (Protocol No. 3 on 21 Sept. 1970, Protocol No. 5 on 20
Dec. 1971, Protocol No. 8 on 1 Jan. 1990, Protocol 11 on 11 Jan. 1998), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B4575C9014916D7A/0/EnglishAnglais.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2006).
153
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IV. THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE:
THE GOODWIN CASE
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (hereafter ‘ECHR’) is presently the
most successful and established of regional human rights
frameworks, and provides a detailed right to freedom of expression
in its Article 10 which has been the subject of a good deal of
litigation and comment. Article 10 and its interpretation is of
increasing significance for member states of the Council of Europe
who are required to conform with the European Court of Human
Rights jurisprudence at the domestic level. Article 10 is
formulated as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive
and impart information and ideas without interference by
public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article
shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it
duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society, in the interests of national security, territorial
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for
preventing the disclosure of information received in
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary.158
Article 10 of the ECHR focuses on opinion, information, ideas
and political processes, but also envisages state regulatory and
licensing regimes.
A number of recent cases before the European Court in
Strasbourg have dealt with freedom of expression and the role of

158

Id.
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the media.159
The European case of Goodwin v. United
Kingdom160 involved the United Kingdom’s contempt laws, and
for our purposes offers an illustration of the court’s approach to the
reporter’s privilege from the perspective of Article 10.161 A
journalist received confidential and potentially damaging financial
information from an unsolicited source relating to a major
company’s corporate plan.162 It turned out, subsequently, that the
file had been stolen, and a judge ordered the publishers to disclose
information regarding the source.163 The European Court felt that
there had been an interference with the right to freedom of
expression, but examined whether this had been justified.164
Following its approach in earlier cases the Court highlighted the
centrality of the right and the particular importance of media
safeguards such as the protection of journalistic sources in the
context of press freedom and democracy.165 In a very strong
statement the ECtHR emphasized the vital role of the media:
“Without such protection . . . the vital public-watchdog role of the
press may be undermined and the ability of the press to provide
accurate and reliable information may be adversely affected.”166
They then applied the necessity and proportionality tests from
the landmark Sunday Times case,167 noting that the member state’s
margin of appreciation is “circumscribed by the interest of
democratic society in ensuring and maintaining a free press.”168 In
finding that Article 10 had been violated, the Court found in this
case that the company’s interests were outweighed by the broader
public interest in a free press.169 Again there was a strong dissent,
159
See, e.g., Jon Gauslaa, European Court Takes Action, BELLONA, Sept. 30, 2005,
http://www.bellona.org/english_import_area/international/russia/envirorights/pasko/40027.
160
Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 484, available at
http://worldii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1996/16.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2007).
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See id.
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Id. § 11.
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Id. § 15.
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See id. §§ 23, 39.
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Id. § 39.
166
Id.
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Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979).
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Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 484, § 40, available at
http://worldii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1996/16.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2007).
169
Id.

JOYCE_STAFFPROOF_032507

582

4/2/2007 11:58:15 AM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

Vol. XVII

but this is a generous interpretation of the right to freedom of
expression in the context of the media, and an illustration of the
European Court’s protection of the media’s functional role within
democracy as well as the special protection it deems necessary for
journalistic sources within this arrangement.
Though the outcome in Goodwin is more comfortable for the
media as a profession than the recent Miller, Lee and Gonzales
cases discussed above, the ECtHR also relies on a vision of a noble
media as public watchdog in its reasoning.170 The vision of a
‘worthy’ media that emerges is again one of the press as involved
in exposing corruption rather than linked to it.171 The difference in
part is to be found in the ECtHR’s location of the protection within
the parameters of Article 10.172 By contrast, the recent United
States decisions appear to minimize the First Amendment’s role
and are ambiguous on the availability of the privilege at the
common law.173 Further, the majority judgment in Goodwin
makes the important point that the systemic value of anonymous
sources and the ongoing relationships between reporters and their
sources are what need to be protected.174 All such relationships,
and consequently the critical news-gathering and investigative
reporting reliant upon them, are thus put at risk from approaching
these cases on the basis only of whether the particular ad hoc facts
fit a heroic or corrupt vision of the media.175 As the Court
recognizes, “[a] source may provide information of little value one
day and of great value the next; what mattered was that the
relationship between the journalist and the source was generating
the kind of information which had legitimate news potential.”176
Thus, a key difference in the jurisprudence is that the European
Court has recognized the systemic importance of the protection of
sources to the media and the “chilling effect” of intruding upon the
170
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173
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relationship between reporter and source.177 The European Court
grounded the protection of sources firmly within the sphere of
freedom of expression, worthy of the highest ‘constitutional’
protection.178 In this vein the majority declares, “[p]rotection of
journalistic sources is one of the basic conditions for press
freedom. . .”179
There is also an emerging policy and soft law framework at the
European level within which the reporter’s privilege might further
develop, following Goodwin. This is best illustrated by a
ministerial recommendation within the Council of Europe on the
right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information.180
However, lest it be thought that Goodwin was the final chapter in
this issue for Europe, there are ongoing tensions regarding the
reception of the European jurisprudence in domestic systems.181 In
2005 the European Commission won a legal battle to obtain a
German journalist’s notes, address books, copies of hard disks and
e-mail records, following the reporter’s Brussels-based
investigative reporting concerning alleged corruption in the
Commission’s statistical office.182 There was at the time concern
that this might reveal the identity of his sources and the reporter,
Hans Martin Tillack, indicated that he might have to seek relief
with the ECHR.183 The difficulty in such a case is that his claim
lay against the EU which itself is not a party to the European
human rights court.184 Any such action would likely have to be
mounted against Belgium, which is bound by, and a party to, the
ECHR. Thus, the case also highlighted issues of systemic
177
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integration regarding European institutions, courts and tribunals,
echoes of which can be seen in the confusion of approaches in
contemporary appellate jurisprudence in the United States.185
V. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW DIMENSION:
THE RANDAL CASE
The approach of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia to the role of war correspondents in
international criminal justice as witnesses,186 has some continuity
with the European human rights jurisprudence examined above and
in particular with the representations of the role of the media and
concerns that this role might be threatened by an overt witnessing
function in international trials. The Randal decision has, however,
been criticized for limiting protection to “war correspondents” only
and thereby creating different standards within the profession and
failing to apply the more universal analysis developed in human
rights cases such as Goodwin to all journalists.187
Journalists themselves have been divided over the issue of
whether they should take a direct role in international criminal
trials by giving evidence for the prosecution. This is especially
controversial when giving evidence may compromise their
function or relationship with sources and future sources. Some
have done so voluntarily, but others see the danger of such a role
as compromising their independence and objectivity, as hampering
their public function via a consequent loss of trust, and even as
leading to their being further targeted by combatants in conflict
zones.188
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See id.
See also Steven Powles, To Testify or Not to Testify—Privilege from Testimony at the
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These issues arose for the first time in an international legal
context in the Brdjanin and Talic case at the ICTY.189 This case
highlighted the role of war correspondents as evidence gatherers in
international criminal law, and the threat this poses to their
work.190 Jonathan Randal, now a retired correspondent for the
Washington Post had interviewed Brdjanin, one of the accused,
with the assistance of an interpreter. An article appeared in 1993.
The article included several quotes attributed to the accused. The
prosecution sought to have the article admitted into evidence to
help prove intent on the part of Brdjanin. The defense objected,
disputing the accuracy of the quotes and representations in the
article, and requiring Randal to be called and cross-examined if the
article were tendered. The Trial Chamber refused to recognize “a
testimonial privilege for journalists when no issue of protecting
confidential sources was involved.”191 The subpoena was upheld
and the article found to be admissible.192 This was appealed and
an amicus brief was filed by a consortium of media companies and
journalist associations.193
Both the Trial and Appeal Chambers of the ICTY recognized
the “vital role” conflict journalists “‘play . . . in bringing to the
attention of the international community the horrors and realities of
the conflict. . . .’”194 Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber took the
view that due process was of greater importance than the
protection of the media, especially as it discerned that the
jurisprudence in human rights (which arguably pointed to a strong
presumption to protect the media’s public function) was aimed
more at cases where journalists were attempting to protect the
confidentiality of their sources (and thus the relationship between
reporter and source).195 The Trial Chamber felt that the test should
be whether the evidence would be “‘pertinent’”196 to the case, a
189
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low threshold. Randal raised a number of arguments, including
reliance on European human rights cases earlier discussed, such as
Goodwin.197 He argued for a qualified testimonial privilege for
war correspondents, and that any subpoena should only be issued
as a last resort.198
The Appeals Chamber, by contrast, took quite a vigorous
position in protecting the role of war correspondents, discussing
their role in the context of the international community’s right to
receive “vital information from war zones . . .”199 The Appeals
Chamber asserted that the news-gathering function of the media
must be protected, that human rights jurisprudence and standards
went further than the protection of confidential sources, but went
to the heart of the media’s institutional role and capacity to
function.200 The Chamber stated: “[w]hat really matters is the
perception that war correspondents can be forced to become
witnesses against their interviewees.”201 This again cuts to the
heart of the relationship between reporter and source. The
dilemma was configured as a balancing exercise between the
public interest in accommodating the work of conflict journalists
and the public interest in the courts having all relevant evidence in
such cases.202 The Appeals Chamber formulated a middle way test
and sent the matter back to the Trial Chamber. The two-pronged
test, which has some continuity with the dissenting Justice
Stewart’s three-pronged formulation in Branzburg, aims to
minimize the need to call journalists in such cases (which so far
appears to have been successful) and involves the following,
“[f]irst, the petitioning party must demonstrate that the evidence
sought is of direct and important value in determining a core issue
in the case. Second, it must demonstrate that the evidence sought
cannot reasonably be obtained elsewhere.”203
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While some journalists have opted to give evidence in
international criminal trials, they remain in the minority. In
general the media continue to claim this qualified privilege, and
there have been arguments made for further reform of this area in
the practice of the International Criminal Court and in the Rome
Statute itself, to give certainty in what remains a rapidly
developing field.204
VI. CONCLUSION
The case of Judith Miller is now both murkier and clearer than
was first thought, and its precedential value also remains uncertain.
The case does not conform to broader heroic narratives of the role
of the journalist in American public life, yet its significance lies in
highlighting the competing visions of the media’s power and role
emerging in the post-Watergate era. It reveals at one level the
historical and political contexts which are crucial to the
development of legal protections for the media and to related ideas
about the First Amendment. It also highlights the ways in which
we are torn between what we want journalism to be and how we
expect the courts to have a role in articulating this role for the
media.
On the one hand there is a vision of the media as a democratic
watchdog that has emerged in traditional First Amendment
jurisprudence205 and which has been picked up in different legal
contexts at the regional European level and in the work of
international courts and tribunals, themselves increasingly faced
with questions regarding media power, its benefits and its dangers.
This comparative backdrop reveals different and competing visions
204
Anastasia Heeger, Securing a Journalist’s Testimonial Privilege in the International
Criminal Court, 6 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 209 (2005).
205
Note, however, that Kyu Ho Youm has recently argued provocatively that despite the
successful U.S. export of the notion of the watchdog internationally, the U.S. courts
themselves have in recent times refused to recognize institutional protections for the news
media. He writes that the watchdog and free flow of information concepts have been
given “little more than perfunctory attention” in recent decisions regarding the privilege
and even in the Branzburg case itself. Kyu Ho Youm, International and Comparative
Law on the Journalist’s Privilege: The Randal Case as a Lesson for the American Press,
1 J. INT’L MEDIA & ENT. L. 1, 53–54 (2006).
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emerging in international and local contexts for the role of the
media in political life.206
On the other hand there is a vision of the media as a threat to
democracy and distorting influence on the democratic public
sphere. As so much of social and political life is mediated, we
both desire and fear a powerful press and are confused as to the
role it might play in our lives. This has caused confusion in the
courts and in the media, and has revealed at times a press not seen
as living up to its lofty ideals, and a court system which both
trumpets media freedom and free speech, yet is quick to quash
such freedom when it threatens the administration of justice or
national security.
Miller reveals both the importance of the media in American
life, but also a shift away from a heroic image of the press in recent
times. It also reveals the ambivalence now felt by many about the
media, and the law’s toughening stance. Ultimately we are caught
between a vision of the media as watchdog and our suspicion that
in certain cases the dog has jumped the fence and may now need
watching itself.
Similar concerns are attached to public
understandings of judicial power and it is no surprise that the
courts have had difficulty with the role of watching the watchdogs.
The cases discussed in this essay also reveal differences in
approaches to the protection of sources depending upon the
context, jurisdiction and specific facts. The trend away from
protection in the United States is particularly strong as regards
criminal law cases involving grand juries such as Branzburg and
Miller, or in a case like Gonzales with its national security
implications. However, the recent civil case of Lee appears to be
following in this direction too. Goodwin, by contrast was a civil
case with facts that related to commercial confidence and did not
involve a Judith Miller style scenario. While finding a violation of
Article 10, the European court did not object to the prior restraint
of Goodwin’s article, a matter which tempers some of the gloss of
Goodwin. Perhaps different facts may have yielded a different
result, though now the case’s broad protection for journalistic
sources seems well entrenched in the European jurisprudence. As
206
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noted, this has not prevented continuing attempts to subpoena
journalists. Lastly, the international criminal case of Randal also
saw the ICTY dealing with a less problematic set of facts than in
Branzburg or Miller. Different facts might have threatened the
finding as to the privilege, especially if such facts involved say
Randal having exculpatory evidence which he refused to divulge.
As such it was relatively uncontroversial for the court to find a
privilege and it limited such a privilege to the heroic ideal at its
highest, the conflict journalist.207
There is at present confusion in the cases in the United States
federal context as competing visions of the media and of
Branzburg’s legacy have emerged. If the Supreme Court is to
revisit Branzburg, it will need to consider closely the political and
historical forces which underscore the competing visions of the
journalist in American life. In so doing the court will have to come
to terms with our complex and often contradictory desires for and
fears of media power and spectacle in a post-Watergate era. It may
also be useful to consider comparative approaches to the protection
of journalistic sources at the European and international level.

207
I am grateful to Professor Richard N. Winfield for helping to clarify these
distinctions.

